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INCOME INEQUALITIES UNDER
ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
IN HONG KONG
 
Zhao Xiaobin, Zhang Li, and Sit Tak O Kelvin
ABSTRACT
 
Hong Kong’s income inequalities have long been situated at a relatively high
level by international standards. This paper investigates the factors that have
contributed to this prolonged phenomenon. We argue that in the absence of
appropriate government actions, economic progress in a laissez-faire capital-
ist system cannot necessarily equalize income distribution.
 
There are contrasting views on the relationship between
economic development and income equality. Some believe that economic
growth will Þnally bring beneÞts to all, therefore alleviating income inequal-
ity. Some argue that economic growth does not necessarily equalize income
distribution. According to Kuznets,
 
1
 
 the level of economic development is the
major determinant of the degree of income inequality. Income inequality tends
to increase during the early stages of economic growth, then levels off, and
Þnally decreases during later stages. There is a great deal of literature in sup-
port of KuznetsÕs view.
 
2
 
 Nonetheless, continuous economic development does
 
1. Simon Kuznets, ÒEconomic Growth and Income Inequality,Ó in 
 
The Gap between Rich and
Poor: Contending Perspectives on the Political Economy of Development
 
, ed. Mitchell Seligson
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 25—37.
2. For example, A. Gilbert and D. Goodman, ÒRegional Income Disparities and Economic De-
velopment: A Critique,Ó 
 
in Development Planning and Spatial Structure
 
, ed. Alan Gilbert (Lon-
don: Wiley, 1976), pp. 113—17; D. Sovoie and I. Brecher, 
 
Equity and EfÞciency in Economic
Development
 
 (Montreal: McGill-QueenÕs University Press, 1992).
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not necessarily increase the living standards of the people, because some can-
not obtain a proper portion of the fruits of such development.
 
3
 
Hong KongÕs case seems to support the view that economic growth may not
have automatically brought equal beneÞts to all those who contributed to Hong
KongÕs economic miracle. Hong Kong has experienced rapid economic growth
since the 1950s. With its gross domestic product (GDP) growth at an average
rate of 6.5% annually in real terms, the economy has more than quadrupled in
size in the last 20 years. Per capita GDP has tripled, equivalent to an average an-
nual growth rate of about 6%, in real terms. It is rare for developing econo-
mies, with the exception of Hong Kong and the three other ÒAsian DragonsÓ
(South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), to make a transition to a developed
status in just two generations. Hong Kong is now one of the richest societies
in the world in terms of per capita GDP. However, it has not won the war of
poverty eradication. The Gini coefÞcient, a measurement of income inequal-
ity, has long been situated at a relatively high level. It was reported that, by
various conservative estimates, there were over 600,000 poor people in Hong
Kong by 1996.
 
4
 
 According to the international or World Bank standard,
ÒpoorÓ designates those people whose monthly household income is below the
median household income, which in Hong Kong is HK$ 15,000, equivalent to
$1,923 in 2003.
 
4
 
 This was more than 11% of the total population at that time.
Data from the 2001 census have further revealed that the recent situation of in-
come inequality is the worst in over 40 years, and the worst among developed
nations. These Þgures are quite shocking, reßecting a prolonged increase in
the gap between rich and poor. It seems that the reality of economic growth
may not, in fact, have generated a more equitable society, but rather the con-
trary. This has prompted wide concern among policymakers about the causes
of worsening income inequality.
The objective of this article is to investigate the factors that have contrib-
uted to the prolonged inequality of income distribution in Hong Kong. We argue
that economic restructuring under the process of globalization has enabled
Hong Kong to retain its high growth of per capita GDP, but, at the same time,
has generated some negative effects on the employment of low-skilled workers.
The new arrivals/immigrants from Mainland China may have changed both
the population and the employment structure in Hong Kong, which may have
contributed to the increase of income inequality. The article also assesses this
impact or contribution of new arrivals to overall Hong Kong income inequality.
 
3. James Midgley, 
 
Social Inequality, Inequality and the Third World
 
 (Chichester, U.K.: John
Wiley & Sons, 1984); James Midgley, 
 
Social Development
 
 (London: Sage, 1995).
4. Mok Tai Kee, 
 
Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty
 
 (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers, 1999).
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 
 
Quarterly Report on General Household
Survey for September—December 2003 
 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Statistical Publisher, 2003).
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The article is organized as follows. It starts with a brief review of the impacts
of economic restructuring on income distribution. It then examines the trends
of income distribution in Hong Kong over the past 40 years, based on the
study of Gini coefÞcients and Lorenz curves. Finally, it will discuss the causes
of the widened income gap and their policy implication. The appendix pro-
vides a brief note on the methodology used in this study.
 
Economic Restructuring, Employment 
Changes, and Income Inequality
 
Employment, a key to an individualÕs or a familyÕs well-being, has greatly in-
ßuenced income disparities. Current literature has highlighted in two major
ways the impact of economic restructuring under globalization on the struc-
ture of employment opportunities in developed economies.
 
5
 
 Firstly, the glo-
balization process signiÞes the transnationalization of economic activities,
shifting business and production from local to global and restructuring the na-
tional economy. The underlying logic of this process is best explained by the
valorization and accumulation of capital. Under the internationalization of
production, certain employment opportunities, especially those for unskilled
or semi-skilled jobs, are relocated away from industrialized countries, where
production costs are usually higher.
 
6
 
 Because economic restructuring has
made jobs more mobile and ßexible, it is inevitable that many of the effects on
manual laborers, rather than on professional, technical, and supervisory work-
ers, have been negative. Secondly, economic liberalism has been accompanied
by globalization. Governments have increasingly left it to the market to deter-
mine developments, instituting neo-liberal or New Right economic ideologies.
The key principles of neo-liberalism include the primacy of the market and
proÞt, and the enhancement of competition, achieved by denationalization of
state-owned companies, privatization of some state services, and deregulation
of the regulatory apparatus applied to business structure and practices. This
means that the economic well-being of individuals is increasingly determined
less by national governments than by the rapidly escalating interdependence
of the world economy. Although one of the major repercussions of economic
liberalism has been to help create a Òfavorable business environmentÓ that is
necessary to cope with global market forces, this in turn generates wider is-
sues of how economic growth could beneÞt everyone.
It is this dual aspect of economic restructuring under globalization that pro-
vides the framework for this study of income inequalities. Globalization, eco-
 
5. Peter Dicken, 
 
Global Shift: Transforming the Global Economy
 
 (London: Paul Chapman,
1998); R. Potter, E. Binns, and D. Smith, 
 
Geographies of Development
 
 (Harlow, U.K.: Addison
Wesley, 1999).
6. B. Berry, E. Conkling, and D. Ray, 
 
The Global Economy in Transition
 
, second edition
(Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997).
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nomic restructuring, and government downsizing are terms used not only to
describe, but also to justify and legitimize, changes in capital-labor relations.
 
7
 
As we can see from the following analysis, the relocation of economic activi-
ties, coupled with insufÞcient government care for low-income classes, has
worsened income distribution in Hong Kong. Although globalization and eco-
nomic restructuring may be seen as positive elements in terms of economic ef-
Þciency and growth, we must not overlook their largely negative impacts on
traditional labor markets and, therefore, income inequalities.
 
An Overall Assessment of Income
Distribution in Hong Kong
 
Worsening of Aggregate Distribution of Income
 
SigniÞcant increases in the median income of Hong Kong households have been
recorded since the 1970s. The median income for 1971 was HK$ 708 ($91),
and it had risen to HK$ 18,705 ($2,398) in 2001, at current prices (Figure 1).
Discounting 10% increases in consumer prices on the average, the median
household income may have gone up as much as 240% from 1971 to 2001.
Tables 1 and 2 list the number of domestic households by monthly income
levels from 1971 to 2001. Currently, there are about 6.8 million people and 2.1
million households in Hong Kong. Generally speaking, there was a rapid de-
cline in the number of low-income households and a corresponding increase
in the number of high-income households. Simple addition of the successive
Þgures shows that from 1971 to 1976, the number of households with incomes
SOURCE: Census and Statistics Department, various years, 1976 to 2001.
figure 1 Monthly Median Household Income, 1971—2001
 
7. John Short and Yeong-Hyun Kim, 
 
Globalization and the City
 
 (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1999).
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under HK$ 1,000 ($128) decreased from 603,077 to 276,760, while house-
holds with incomes over that amount went up from 253,931 to 675,820. This
dramatic change in the respective numbers of low- and high-income house-
holds continued in subsequent years.
However, increases in per capita income do not necessarily represent an
amelioration of income inequality. Although rapid economic growth has re-
sulted in a net rise in the middle-income population in Hong Kong, we cannot
see whether everybody has beneÞted to the same extent. Growth may turn out,
upon further investigation, to have beneÞted only the richest few, leaving most
of the population relatively poor.
By comparing the data from the eight censuses, it is easy to see that there
were considerable changes, decile by decile, from one census to another, in
the income share ratio from 1966 to 2001 (Tables 3 and 4). As shown by the
census data, income distribution improved only between 1966 and 1971. The
increase in the aggregate income share of low-income households and a corre-
sponding decrease for the richest ones represent a narrowing of income in-
equality at that time.
However, the situation has totally changed since 1971. A notable deteriora-
tion of aggregate distribution can be observed. The cumulative share of the
bottom 60% of households declined continuously (Figures 2 and 3). Even in
the middle-income households (the middle 20% to 60%), the share began to
decline in 1981 (Figure 4). The income share of the bottom 60% of house-
holds dropped from 30.7% in 1971 to 23.6% in 2001, while the top 30% and
 
table
 
1
 
Number of Households by Monthly Income, 1971 and 1976
 
Monthly Household Income (HK$) 1971 1976
 
Less than 200 (US$26) 41,457 16,680
200—399 (US$26—$51) 90,113 29,560
400—599 (US$51—$77) 205,511 51,580
600—799 (US$77—$102) 169,023 87,430
800—999 (US$103—$128) 96,973 91,510
1,000—1,199 (US$128—$154) 81,302 102,690
1,200—1,499 (US$154—$192) 62,249 128,820
1,500—1,999 (US$192—$256) 40,384 154,080
2,000—2,499 (US$256—$320) 28,333 98,810
2,500—4,499 (US$321—$577) 27,215 131,800
4,500—7,500 (US$577—$962) and over 14,448 59,620
 
Total
 
857,008 952,580
 
SOURCE: Census and Statistics Department, 
 
Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics 1978
 
 (Hong
 
Kong: The Government Printer, 1978).
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especially, the top 10% of households began to enjoy a remarkable increase in
their share of the overall income after 1976. Throughout the 1980s, the top
20% of households managed to concentrate over 50% of the income in their
hands. Their share continued to increase to 56.5% in 2001. What is more, the
share of the top 10% reached about 42% during that period (Tables 3 and 4,
Figure 5). It is unusual for the richest stratum to control well over half of the
national income in a developed society, but Hong Kong is an exception. The
persistent decline in the respective shares of bottom- and middle-income house-
holds, with increases only among upper-income households, clearly signiÞes a
deterioration in the aggregate distribution of income in Hong Kong over the
past 30 years and a concomitant increase in income inequality.
 
table
 
2
 
Number of Households by Monthly Income, 1981—2001
 
Monthly Household 
Income (HK$) 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
 
Under 2,000 (US$256) 355,437 141,289 75,552 55,597 65,855
2,000—3,999 
(US$256—$513) 477,995 368,884 115,236 68,273 97,568
4,000—5,999 
(US$513—$769) 209,281 340,871 202,511 75,595 93,018
6,000—7,999
(US$769—$1,026) 91,622 209,360 218,388 105,639 116,340
8,000—9,999
(US$1,026—$1,282) 42,742 125,631 181,846 136,577 120,721
10,000—14,999
(US$1,282—$1,923) 39,375 146,199 314,379 324,001 318,623
15,000—19,999
(US$1,923—$2,564) 12,250 53,412 176,406 269,694 262,086
20,000—24,999
(US$2,564—$3,205) 6,152 25,931 99,646 210,926 223,708
25,000—29,999
(US$3,205—$3,846) 2,599 12,628 56,851 147,295 159,470
30,000—39,999
(US$3,846—$5,128) 2,561 13,579 60,169 183,254 219,229
40,000—59,999
(US$5,128—$7,692) 4,724* 8,358 44,794 150,440 197,311
60,000 (US$7,692) 
and over NA 6,440 36,434 128,263 179,483
 
Total
 
1,244,738 1,452,576 1,582,215 1,855,553 2,053,412
 
SOURCE: Census and Statistics Department, various years, 1981—2001.
 
* Number of households with monthly income HK$40,000.00 (US$5,128) or over.
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table
 
3
 
Distribution of Total Household Income by Deciles, 1966—2001
 
 (%)
 
Decile 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
 
1st (lowest) 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9
2nd 4 3.9 3.5 3.2 3.4 3 2.6 2.3
3rd 3.8 5.1 4.6 4.4 4.4 4 3.6 3.4
4th 4.3 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.4 5 4.6 4.4
5th 5.6 7 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.1 5.7 5.6
6th 6.8 7.3 8.1 7.8 7.6 7.4 7 7.0
7th 7.5 9 8.8 9.4 9.1 9 8.5 8.8
8th 9 11 11.3 11.5 11.4 11.4 10.6 11.1
9th 12.2 14.7 15.9 15.2 15.2 15.5 14.5 15.3
10th (highest) 45.5 34.6 33.6 35.2 35.5 37.3 41.8 41.2
 
Total
 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
 
SOURCE: Stephen Chow, 
 
Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Hong Kong
 
 (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University MicroÞlms International, 1977); Census and Statistics Department, various
 
years, 1971—2001).
 
table
 
4
 
Distribution of Total Household Income by Deciles, 1966—2001
 
 (%)
 
Decile 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001
% Change
(1971—2001)
 
Bottom 10% 1.3 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9
 
2
 
60.9
Bottom 20% 5.3 6.2 5.4 4.6 5 4.3 3.7 3.2
 
2
 
48.3
Bottom 30% 9.1 11.3 10 9 9.4 8.3 7.3 6.6
 
2
 
41.6
Bottom 40% 13.4 16.4 15.5 14.4 14.8 13.3 11.9 11.0
 
2
 
32.9
Bottom 50% 19 23.4 22.3 20.9 21.2 19.4 17.6 16.6
 
2
 
29
Bottom 60% 25.8 30.7 30.4 28.7 28.8 26.8 24.6 23.6
 
2
 
23
Middle 20% 12.4 14.3 14.9 14.3 14 13.5 12.7 12.6
 
2
 
11.9
Middle 40% 24.2 28.4 29.2 29.1 28.5 27.5 25.8 25.8
 
2
 
9.2
Middle 60% 37 44.5 45.1 45 44.3 42.9 40 40.3
 
2
 
9.4
Top 30% 66.7 60.3 60.8 61.9 62.1 64.2 66.9 67.6 12.1
Top 20% 57.7 49.3 49.5 50.4 50.7 52.8 56.3 56.5 14.6
Top 10% 45.5 34.6 33.6 35.2 35.5 37.3 41.8 41.2 19
 
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
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figure 2 Income Shares of the Bottom 10%, 20%, and 30% of Households, 
1966—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
figure 3 Income Shares of the Bottom 40%, 50%, and 60% of Households, 
1966—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
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figure 4 Income Shares of the Middle 20%, 40%, and 60% of Households, 
1966—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
figure 5 Income Shares of the Top 10%, 20%, and 30% of Households,
1966—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
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By computing the percentage change of income shares for different groups
from 1971 to 2001, as given in Table 4, shocking results can be found. In the
course of those 30 years, the bottom 10% to 60% of householdsÑas well as
the middle 60% of householdsÑsuffered heavy declines in their income
share. The lower the income group, the greater the reduction of its share. The
bottom 10% of households suffered the heaviest reduction (60.9%) in income
share. The reduction for the bottom 20% of households was 48.3%, while that
of the bottom 30% was 41.6%. Even the bottom 60% as a whole was reduced
by 23%. It is disturbing, furthermore, to note that the respective income shares
of the middle 20%, 40%, and 60% of households were also reduced variously
by 9% to 12%. Under the circumstances, it is not impossible for the middle-
income class to end up relatively impoverished.
It is observable that only the top 30% of Hong Kong households was able to
enjoy a continual increase in income share in the course of the last few de-
cades. In contrast to the situation of the middle- and lower-income house-
holds, the higher the income group, the greater the increase in its share of the
national wealth. While the income share of the top 30% of households in-
creased by nearly 12%, that of the top 20% of households went up over 15%.
The share of the wealthiest 10% grew by 19% (Table 4).
Such a pattern of change in income share is, moreover, an indication that
the rich, especially the very rich, are able to generate their wealth much faster
than the lower classes in the process of rapid economic growth. The growth of
the economy no doubt has greatly beneÞted the rich. The middle-income
groups have beneÞted only moderately and the lowest groups have beneÞted
least.
In Table 4, we can also observe that the households with the lowest income
have always received an extremely small share of the total. The biggest share in
the course of the eight census years was only 2.3% for the bottom 10% of
households, 6.2% for the bottom 20%, and 11.3% for the bottom 30%. Their
respective income shares reached a nadir in 2001Ñ0.9%, 3.2%, and 6.6%.
Compared with the lionÕs share of over 50% for the top 20% of households,
these Þgures can be said to show the bottom percentiles as relatively poor.
Although income inequality improved somewhat in the 1960s and 1970s,
special attention should be paid to the worsening aggregate distribution of in-
come and the signiÞcant widening of the gap between rich and poor in more
recent years and in the foreseeable future. It is indeed worrisome to observe
that with the highest income households increasing their wealth progressively
faster than the middle- and lower-income households, the widening of the gap
has become serious in Hong Kong. Judging from the Þgures for 2001, the year
of the most recent census, when the highest 20% of households surpassed the
remaining 80% by well over 10% (see Table 4), income distribution is strik-
ingly uneven.
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Income Inequalities
 
This trend reßects increasing income inequality over three decades. By plot-
ting the Lorenz curves and computing the Gini coefÞcients of income distribu-
tion, a long-term trend of increases and a notably high end point by the 2001
census can be demonstrated.
Lorenz curves representing the distribution of household incomes for the
past 35 years are presented in Figures 6, 7, and 8. They show that income in-
equality has been exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, during the past few de-
cades. The Lorenz curves deviated quite far from the line of equality toward
the X-axis, one after another. It is only between 1966 and 1971 that inequality
was reduced. In 1966, income inequality in Hong Kong was its worst ever.
The curve for 1966 is the furthest from the line of equality between the Lorenz
curves of all census years, as compared to the curves for 1971 and 1976.
When we look at Figure 8, it is easy to see that the Lorenz curve for 2001,
which is the furthest from the line of equality and which signiÞcantly deviates
from the other four curves for 1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996, representing a
sharp increase in income inequality from 1981. The pattern of the Lorenz
curves, taken as a whole, can be taken to show that Hong KongÕs economy has
produced a high degree of income inequality, comparable to that of rela-
tively undeveloped third-world countries.
The rising Gini coefÞcients shown in Figure 9 for the years subsequent to
1971, comparable to the rather more attenuated shape of the Lorenz curves,
support the conclusion that there has been a steady exacerbation of income in-
equality in Hong Kong over the past 35 years. The Gini coefÞcient fell from
0.48 in 1957 to 0.43 in 1971, which represented an improvement.
 
8
 
 But the
cause of the improvement is exactly the initial massive industrialization in
which many small and export-led industries in textiles and garments were
blossoming during the period 1966—71.
 
9
 
 Since 1976, however, the Gini coefÞ-
cient has shown a net rise, while Hong KongÕs industrialization has increas-
ingly become developed and mature. In 1981, the Gini coefÞcient was 0.45
and 0.476 in 1991. The Gini coefÞcient of 1996 went up to 0.518, and further
to 0.525 in 2001.
 
10
 
 Comparing a changing trend in the Gini coefÞcients, we
can see that the degree of income inequality for the most recent census period
is in fact worse than it was 35 years before.
 
8. S. Chow and G. Papanek, ÒLaissez-faire, Growth and EquityÑHong Kong,Ó
 
 Economic
Journal
 
 91:6 (1981), pp. 466—85.
9. Lui Hon Kwong, 
 
Income Inequality and Economic Development in Hong Kong
 
 (Hong
Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 1997).
10. Census and Statistics Department, 
 
Population Census: Basic Tables for Constituency
Areas: Hong Kong Island
 
 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 2001).
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figure 6 Lorenz Curves of Income Distribution, 1966—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
figure 7 Lorenz Curves of Income Distribution, 1966—1976
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
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figure 8 Lorenz Curves of Income Distribution, 1981—2001
SOURCE: Same as Table 3.
figure 9 Gini CoefÞcient of Income Distribution in Hong Kong,
1966—2001
SOURCE: S. Chow and G. Papanek, ÒLaissez-faire, Growth and EquityÑHong Kong,Ó in Eco-
nomic Journal 91:6 (1981), pp. 466—85; Census and Statistics Department, various years.
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The Gini coefÞcients recorded have never been lower than 0.4 in Hong
Kong. All of them fall within the standard range for developing countries,11
though Hong KongÕs economy has been well developed. In comparison to devel-
oped countries like the United States, Canada, and those of Western Europe with
relatively equitable income distributions, characterized by Gini coefÞcients be-
low 0.35, Hong Kong has a relatively high degree of income inequality. The
concomitant of rapid economic growth in Hong Kong, as it happens, has been a
worsening of income inequality. It has not resulted in a more equitable society.
A Comparative Perspective
A cross-country study was conducted for a comparison between the aggregate
distribution of income and the overall economic level of Hong Kong with six
other countriesÑGuatemala, Spain, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Japan,
and the United States.12 The study found that Hong Kong actually ranked
above both Singapore and the U.K. in 1990 in terms of economic develop-
ment, as its per capita income of US$16,230 was the third-highest, after that
of the United States and Japan (Table 5). However, the distribution of house-
hold income for Hong Kong in 1991 looked more like that of Guatemala in
1979—81, a low level economy with GDP per capita of no more than $2,920
in 1990. This was not at all like Spain, Singapore, the U.K., or even Japan and
the United States at various measurement points in the late 1970s and the early
11. Lui, Income Inequality and Economic Development in Hong Kong.
12. Tsang Shu Kei, ÒIncome Distribution,Ó in The Other Hong Kong Report 1993, eds. Choi
Po-King and Ho Lok Sang (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 361—68.
table 5 A Comparison of Quintile Household Income Distribution
Hong 
Kong Guatemala Spain Singapore
United
Kingdom Japan USA
GDP per capita
in 1990 (US$) 16,230 2,920 10,840 14,920 14,960 16,950 21,360
Statistical year 1991 1979—81 1980—81 1982—83 1979 1979 1985
First quintile 4.3 5.5 6.9 5.1 5.8 8.7 4.7
Second quintile 9 8.6 12.5 9.9 11.5 13.2 11
Third quintile 13.5 12.2 17.3 14.6 18.2 17.5 17.4
Fourth quintile 20.4 18.7 23.2 21.4 25 23.1 25
Fifth quintile 52.8 55 40 48.9 39.5 37.5 41.9
Top 10% 37.3 40.8 24.5 33.5 23.3 22.4 25
SOURCE: Tsang Shu Kei, ÒIncome Distribution,Ó in The Other Hong Kong Report 1993, eds.
Choi Po-King and Ho Lok-Sang (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1994), pp. 361—68.
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and mid-1980s. Hong KongÕs degree of income inequality was worse than that
of all of the countries studied other than Guatemala.13 The respective share of
the Þrst to fourth quintiles was smaller for Hong Kong, while the share of the
Þfth quintile was much higher. It is worth noting that the share of the top 10%
of households in Hong Kong was more than 4% above that for Singapore and
more than 10% above that for each of the other developed countries.
The data from the United Nations conÞrmed the Þnding of the above study.
Table 6 shows that the income gap between the top and bottom quartile of
households in Hong Kong was 10 times in 1986 and reached 15 times in 1996.
The Hong Kong situation of income inequality was much worse than that of West-
ern countries, and surprisingly, even that of many developing countries in Asia.
More updated data show that Hong Kong was ranked quite high in terms of
the Gini coefÞcients (Table 7). Among the Òhigh-income economies,Ó accord-
ing to the 2001 edition of the United Nations Human Development Report,14
table 6 Income Distribution as a Ratio of Top Quartile to Bottom Quartile 
(1975—1986)
Western Countries Asian Countries
Netherlands 4.4 Taiwan 4.2
Belgium 4.6 Japan 4.3
Germany 5.0 Israel 6.7
Hungary 5.2 South Korea 6.8
Ireland 5.5 India 7.0
Sweden 5.6 Bangladesh 7.2
United Kingdom 5.7 Indonesia 7.3
Switzerland 5.8 Sri Lanka 8.3
Spain 5.8 Thailand 8.8
Finland 6.0 The Philippines 10.3
Norway 6.4 Hong Kong 10.1 (1986)
Italy 7.1 12.3 (1991)
Denmark 7.2 15.2 (1996)
United States 7.5
France 7.7
Australia 8.7
New Zealand 8.8
SOURCE: Mok Tai Kee, Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers Ltd.,
1999), p. 17.
13. Ibid.
14. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2001, ,http://www.
undp.org/hdr2001/., accessed May 14, 2003.
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there were few, except Hong Kong, in which the top quintile took more than
50% of the total national income.
In summary, the Þndings of this empirical analysis suggest that although
Hong Kong has succeeded in making the transition to a developed economy in
a relatively short period, the concomitant of this rapid economic growth has
been an exacerbation of income inequality. There is no evidence of wealth
trickling down from the top to the bottom. On the contrary, there has been
increasing inequality and polarization.
table 7 A Cross-Country Comparison of Gini CoefÞcients
Countries Gini CoefÞcients Statistical Year
Brazil 0.601 1995
South Africa 0.593 1994
Chile 0.565 1994
United Kingdom 0.53 2000
Hong Kong 0.525 2001
Mexico 0.519 2000
Malaysia 0.492 2000
Singapore 0.481 2000
Russia 0.487 1996
Peru 0.462 1996
The Philippines 0.461 2000
United States 0.46 1999
Australia 0.44 1998
China 0.415 1995
Thailand 0.414 2000
India 0.378 2000
Nepal 0.367 1996
Israel 0.355 1992
Mongolia 0.332 1995
France 0.327 1995
Indonesia 0.317 2000
South Korea 0.316 1993
Canada 0.315 1994
Pakistan 0.312 1996
Germany 0.3 1994
Sweden 0.258 1992
Norway 0.25 1992
Japan 0.249 1993
SOURCE: Ming Pao (Hong Kong), October 26, 2001; Apple Daily (Hong Kong), October 27,
2001; United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2001, ,http://
www.undp.org/hdr2001/., accessed May 14, 2003.
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Factors Explaining Income Inequality
Factors associated with economic restructuring can be blamed for the severe
inequalities. We identify two broad factors: economic and institutional.
Industrial Restructuring
In the past three decades, the Hong Kong economy has been undergoing sig-
niÞcant restructuring. Except for certain quota-restricted businesses, a large
number of traditional industries have been moved outside the territory. Manu-
facturing, which used to be Hong KongÕs largest employment sector, has lost
its dominant position since 1980. ÒDeindustrializationÓ has continued to pro-
ceed with full force in the 1990s. It is shown in Figure 10 that the number of
manufacturing workers fell by over half from 898,900 in 1984 to only 209,329
in 2001 (Figure 10). This drop in the manufacturing work force of about 80%
in 15 years cannot be regarded as insigniÞcant. In contrast, there was a re-
markable expansion of the service sector, where employment increased
sharply from 743,300 in 1984 to 2,025,745 in 2001, a nearly threefold in-
crease.15 Although the service sector has now become the largest single em-
ployment sector, when one takes into account the many difÞculties of job shift-
ing, it is questionable whether the sector can accommodate all unemployed
former manufacturing workers.
15. Census and Statistics Department, 2001 Population Census Summary Results, ,http://
www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/01c/01c_index.html., accessed June 13, 2003.
figure 10 Number of People Employed in Selected Industry Sectors
SOURCE: Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends 1995
(Hong Kong: The Government Printer, 1996); Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong 2001
Population Census Main Report (Hong Kong: The Government Printer, 2001).
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The initiative for deindustrialization came from thousands of business de-
cisions made by individual factory owners seeking to evade the high cost of
production in Hong Kong. In the course of the large-scale processes of de-
industrialization, most manufacturing Þrms (except for those producing quota-
restricted products like textiles and garments) have moved to Mainland China
or to Southeast Asia, in order to take advantage of low production costs there.
The industrial ÒoutmigratingÓ process has been accompanied by a process of
Òwhite-collarizationÓ in the manufacturing industry in Hong Kong territory.
This industrial restructuring process amounted to a phase-out of Òblue-collarÓ
industrial operations, which typically employed non-skilled workers, replacing
them with higher value-added processes like product design, product market-
ing, and other Þnancial and/or commercial services, which require employees
with professional qualiÞcations. Hong Kong started to transform itself in the
1980s from a Òproduct-producingÓ site into a Òproduct-managingÓ center.
There are many reports that transnational companies like Motorola closed their
manufacturing operations in Hong Kong and moved production lines to lower-
cost countries.
During a transition from an industrial economy to a service economy, a
large number of workers previously working in manufacturing industries be-
come marginalized. Many of them are forced to seek jobs in the service sector
that require different qualiÞcations. Those who cannot meet the new profes-
sional criteria (i.e., those without the requisite professional knowledge and
necessary qualiÞcations) are phased out of employment. Such people include
middle-aged, unskilled, female workers and youngsters with low education
levels. Since many former manufacturing workers are unable to Þnd suitable
jobs and therefore join the army of unemployed, poverty resulting from unem-
ployment among the non-skilled segments of the labor force has exacerbated
the pattern of income inequalities.
It is signiÞcant to note that from June 2001, the unemployment situation
grew even more severe; the unemployment rate increased by 0.2% in just one
month, compared to Þgures in May 2001 (see Table 8). Such deterioration has
not improved since, and in fact the unemployment level reached the near-
historical high of 6.8% in February 2002, with over 220,000 people out of
work (see Table 8).
A large surplus of available workers has further exacerbated the unemploy-
ment situation. Apart from the pool of workers released from the manufactur-
ing sector, this surplus is a function of the return of increasing numbers of
former emigrants and expatriates, and also of a greater inßow of immigrants
from China.16 Unemployment among the ranks of manual workers is serious
16. R. Skeldon, ÒImmigration and Population Issues,Ó in The Other Hong Kong Report 1995,
ed. Stephen Cheung (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), pp. 303—16; Government
Information Services Department, Hong Kong 1996 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1997).
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table 8 Unemployment and Under-employment, 1997—2002
Period
No. of 
Unemployed
Unemployment
Rate (%)
No. of
Under-
employed
Under-
employment
Rate (%)
1997
July 69,000 2.4 37,800 1.2
August 71,200 2.4 37,400 1.2
September 69,700 2.2 33,100 1.0
October 74,000 2.3 33,300 1.0
November 75,700 2.4 37,100 1.1
December 76,800 2.5 44,000 1.3
1998
January 73,300 2.5 49,200 1.5
February 87,900 2.9 53,200 1.6
March 106,200 3.5 63,600 1.9
April 121,700 3.9 72,400 2.2
May 129,700 4.1 85,800 2.6
June 143,700 4.4 86,000 2.6
July 161,000 4.8 88,000 2.6
1999
Whole year 207,500 6.2 96,900 3.0
2000
Whole year 4.9 93,500 2.8
2001
January 142,900 4.5 89,400 2.6
February 147,200 4.5 82,200 2.4
March 149,700 4.5 77,700 2.3
April 153,700 4.5 74,700 2.2
May 151,900 4.5 77,400 2.3
June 152,600 4.5 75,100 2.2
July 160,800 4.7 73,700 2.2
August 172,200 4.9 74,800 2.2
September 185,600 5.3 84,400 2.5
October 194,400 5.5 91,000 2.6
November 204,800 5.8 98,200 2.9
December 209,800 6.1 104,300 3.0
2002
January 218,800 6.7 111,800 3.2
February 228,000 6.8 109,000 3.2
SOURCE: Mok Tai Kee, Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers Ltd.,
1999), p. 241; Hong Kong Council of Social Service, Eradication of Poverty Website, ,http://
poverty.socialnet.org.hk., accessed June 3, 2003; Census and Statistics Department, various years.
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17. Mok, Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty.
18. Hong Kong Council of Social Service, Labor and Poverty Conference 1996 (Hong Kong).
and is a principal reason for the continual slide in the income share of the
bottom 10% of households.17
The existence of this large pool of unemployed blue-collar workers may
even have an effect on the employment situation in other sectors of the econ-
omy, thus triggering a decrease in the real income of the working class. Many
of the unemployed were driven to seek jobs in the service sector. Due to their
low levels of education and other skills, however, many of them could only
compete for low-paid unskilled positions, and ended up with reduced incomes.18
The employment situation for these jobs deteriorates, owing to the large number
of applicants (i.e., a large labor supply) and the limited number of unskilled-
job vacancies. Employers are likely to suppress wages or to require employees
to work long hours. One study found that in the 1990s, the number of employed
poor people (whose income level is below half of the median income) had in-
creased much faster than the number of total employed, indicating that more
and more unskilled workers were underpaid (Table 9). According to the popu-
table 9 Estimated Number of Poverty Population with Employment,
1993—1997
Year
Median Income
(HK$)
Poverty Line
(HK$)
Poverty
Population
with
Employment
(10 thousand)
Total
Employment
(10 thousand)
1993 7,000
(US$897)
3,500
(US$449)
18.3 279.1
1994 8,000
(US$1,026)
4,500
(US$577)
23.8 291.1
1995 8,000
(US$1,026)
4,250
(US$545)
28.8 298.9
1996 9,000
(US$1,154)
4,500
(US$577)
29.9 308.1
1997 10,000
(US$1,282)
5,000
(US$641)
30.6 311.3
Change from
1993 to 1997 67.2% 11.5%
SOURCE: Mok Tai Kee, Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty (Hong Kong: Joint Publishers,
1999), p. 221.
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lation census of 2001, the median income of the unemployment households of
Hong Kong in 2001 is $10,000 ($1,282), which is the same as in 1997.19 Thus,
the richest 20% of the population had seen their share of income increase
(see Table 4). Therefore, the only reason that can explain such staggering in
the median income between 1997 and 2001 is the severe worsening of income
in the bottom group of the population.
In contrast, the employment situation in the Òhigher value-addedÓ positions
(such as upper management and other professional work) has been least af-
fected, since these skilled, Òknowledge-basedÓ jobs require a variety of speciÞc
qualiÞcations. Hence, the labor market has been dichotomized and income
gaps have widened. At the lower levels (the non-skilled market), people com-
pete for jobs with few questions asked about the conditions of employment. At
the upper levels, on the other hand, people are able to keep a standard com-
mensurate with their professional qualiÞcations. According to the latest cen-
sus, the monthly per capita income among the top 10% of households was HK$
27,800 ($3,564) in 2000, while those bottom 10% of households earned only
HK$ 1,400 ($179).
In addition, the low level of unionization in Hong Kong (Table 10), together
with the emergence of monopolies of large corporations with sizable market
power, guarantees relatively weak bargaining power on the part of low-level
employees with regard to remuneration and fringe beneÞts. It means that non-
skilled workers as a group are especially vulnerable to the depressed eco-
nomic conditions of a tightening traditional labor market under economic
19. Mok, Eradication of Hong Kong Poverty; Census and Statistics Department, 2001 Popula-
tion Census Summary Results, ,http://www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/01c/01c_index.
html., accessed June 13, 2003.
table 10 Labor Force Participation Rate in Trade Unions
Year Participation Rate
1995 22.8
1996 22.6
1997 22.6
1998 23.3
1999 24.1
SOURCE: Global Policy Network, Current Labor Market Conditions in Hong Kong, ,http://
www.globalpolicynetwork.org/data/hongkong/hk-analysis.pdf., accessed June 14, 2003.
NOTE: The participation rate is deÞned as a ratio of the number of union members to the total
number of salaried employees.
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restructuring. Therefore, persistent, wide income gaps remain, as demonstrated
above.
Government Policies
To a large extent, the Hong Kong governmentÕs overriding growth-oriented
development strategies, plus its largely passive role with regard to income re-
distribution, has contributed to the exacerbation of income inequality. The
government places maximization of growth as top priority, to the exclusion of
any policy concerned with a more equal distribution of income. It accepts a
theory that holds that Òattempts to bring about a redistribution of income in fa-
vor of lower income groups by progressive taxation, minimum wage legisla-
tion and social security beneÞts will reduce the Þnancial differential which
separates success and failure and which is held to be the main spring of expan-
sion.Ó20 As a result, the Hong Kong government has concentrated more of its
efforts on promoting economic growth than on distributive justice. Since there
is no progressive taxation, no minimum wage, no comprehensive social safety
net, only a small proportion of the population is able to reap the beneÞts of
economic growth.
In order to sustain a high degree of competitiveness for Hong KongÕs econ-
omy under the pressure of globalization, the government believes that main-
taining a small and efÞcient public sector is a crucial aspect of Þscal policy.21
The underlying principle is to ensure that the government will not crowd out
an excessive amount of resources from the private sector. In concrete terms,
the growth rate of the public sector is to be kept slower than that of the econ-
omy. Under this spending principle, the government always allocates its
resources to social welfare as sparsely as possible.
It is clear that priority in government policy making has been given to eco-
nomic growth rather than to social justice, as the government is really unwill-
ing to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor and thus plays a passive
role in the amelioration of income inequality. This, on the one hand, is because
the government wants to be Òbusiness-friendly.Ó Large-scale social welfare
would displace the proÞts from the hands of the rich, who are the major play-
ers for economic investment. On the other hand, the government chooses not
to carry out progressive social security policies, mainly because of a fear of
creating a Òdependency culture,Ó which discourages unemployed people from
working and allows them to depend Þnancially on others, thus ultimately under-
cutting Hong KongÕs prosperity and preventing the attainment of maximum
20. Nicholas Owen, The Decline of Competition with Industrial Maturity: The Implications for
Income Distribution in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong
Kong, 1971).
21. Government Information Services Department, Hong Kong 1996.
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growth.22 These cautious attitudes were reßected in the Report on the Review
of the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) Scheme published
in December 1998.23 The report, under the subheading of ÒSupport for Self-
reliance,Ó laid down guidelines for the future of the CSSA program. The plan
was to cut welfare assistance and grants for the able-bodied unemployed, thus
allowing the government to Òcut fatÓ in welfare expenditures. Besides provid-
ing insufÞcient welfare assistance, the government offered little means to help
former manufacturing workers transition to the service sector, providing only
a few types of assistance such as retraining programs, career counseling, or re-
cruitment services.24 This is evidence that the Hong Kong government is only
weakly motivated, if at all, to seek to use employment services to control the
widening income gap. Contrary to the experience of other developed econo-
mies, the growth of afßuence in Hong Kong has so far not been accompanied
by a corresponding development of an adequate social security system.
As the government purports to practice laissez-faire capitalism, its interven-
tion in the economic realm is very limited. The fruits of growth are distributed
largely by market mechanisms; therefore, an uneven income distribution is in-
evitable. Government intervention in the labor market is also kept to a mini-
mum. The governmentÕs past failure, in response to employer opposition, to
establish minimum wages, unemployment insurance, and universal old age
pensions is a key factor behind the increasing income inequalities today.25 For
several decades, the Hong Kong government has been focused on maintaining
economic growth rather than on promoting redistributive justice.
Hong KongÕs government policies, of course, have not been totally non-
interventionist.26 The government does subsidize, to a certain degree, the less-
fortunate members of society in the areas of housing, education, and medical
services. Its redistributive efforts on income distribution, albeit insufÞcient,
cannot be regarded as nonexistent.27 Nevertheless, these efforts are not as pro-
nounced in Hong Kong as elsewhere because of the relatively small amount of
public expenditure and the rather passive role of the government in income
22. Wong Hung, ÒXianggang Jiushi Niandai Pinqiong de Yuanyin: Miguan, Wenguan, yu
Zhongching de FenshiÓ [The causes for poverty in 1990s Hong Kong: Micro, macro and metro
analysis], in Pinqiong de Shehui Fazhan [Poverty and social development] (Hong Kong: Asia
Monitor Resource Centre and Hong Kong Social Security Society, 2000), pp. 3—30.
23. Hong Kong Council of Social Service, Report on the Review of the Comprehensive Social
Security Assistance [CSSA] Scheme (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Statistical Publisher, 1998).
24. Hong Kong Council of Social Service, Labor and Poverty Conference 1996.
25. Stephen C. M. Chow, Economic Growth and Income Distribution in Hong Kong (Ann Arbor,
Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1997); Ronald L. I. Hsia and Laurence C. Chau,
Industrialization, Employment and Income Distribution: A Case Study of Hong Kong (London:
Croom Helm, 1978).
26. Hsia and Chau, Industrialization, Employment.
27. Chow, Economic Growth and Income Distribution; Tsang, Income Distribution.
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distribution. Total public expenditures as a percentage of GDP were under
20% in most years, far below the level in many developed countries. This
raises questions on how much the poverty class could really beneÞt from gov-
ernment redistributive policies. This can be illustrated by examining the pub-
lic housing and social welfare programs.
The public housing program in Hong Kong has long been seen as unable to
provide accommodation for all low-income households in need. Just as in 1990,
over 150,000 families on the waiting list are still living in substandard accom-
modations or suffering a heavy rental burden in the private property market.
The average waiting time to obtain public housing is 6.5 years.28 What is more,
the public housing program is not primarily targeted on the very poor. It is, in
fact, middle-income households that have received the largest proportion of
housing subsidies.29 If we consider that the middle-income category includes a
certain number of professionals and senior government ofÞcials, this means that
a privileged minority beneÞted more than the low-income majority and that the
inequality may be worse than what we have observed in the published data.
While thousands and thousands of dollars of subsidies are spent for the already-
comfortable, the redistributive effect for the very poor is truly insigniÞcant.
Coverage by the social welfare net is too small and eligibility requirements
are too strict. Many people who have hardships in life are indeed ill-served.
Especially in the case of elderly care, the government has always faced public
criticism for failure to promise anything beyond a minimum standard of liv-
ing.30 The social welfare provision in Hong Kong has even been less compre-
hensive than in other societies whose levels of economic development are
much lower. A comparison of the ratio of received social security allowances
to average wages among a few major Chinese cities shows that the ratio for
Hong Kong is the smallest, only about 16% or 19.4%, depending on the recip-
ient category (Table 11). The Þgures are 34% for Taipei, 60% for Guangzhou,
34% for Shanghai, and 44% for Beijing. Hong Kong comes in at only half or
less than these Þgures. That means that the social security system in Hong
Kong is still limited in scope. The severely limited spending for social welfare
in general and for the poor-assistance program in particular is not enough to
justify the governmentÕs efforts to allocate the fruits of development to all
income classes equally. It may be that welfare shortages have also contributed
to the exacerbation of income inequality.
28. Housing Branch of Government Secretariat, Long Term Housing Strategy Review (Hong
Kong: Government Printer, 1997).
29. Li Si Ming and Yu Fu Lai, ÒThe Redistribution Effects of Hong KongÕs Public Housing
Programme 1976—86,Ó Urban Studies 27:1 (1990), pp. 105—18.
30. Government Information Services Department, Hong Kong: A New Era, Hong Kong 1998
(Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1998).
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Income inequality resulting from reduced wages for low-skilled workers is
also a consequence of the relatively recent privatization of public services
promoted by the government. In the course of the 1990s, under the pressure of
economic restructuring and the inßuence of the ÒNew Right,Ó many Hong
Kong public Þrms were privatized, and operated in the free market. Notable
examples include the privatization of parking lot administration and cleaning
services for the Hong Kong Housing Authority. The jobs offered by such Þrms
are normally low-skilled. However, the rights to operate privatized services
are usually allocated to the lowest bidder, which impels such businesses to
reduce their operating costs. Wages, as a major part of those costs, are, of
course, held down. Moreover, as part of a cost-cutting strategy, Þrms may em-
ploy only a small number of ÒcoreÓ employees for management and skilled
positions and a large number of Ònon-coreÓ workers to Þt into non-skilled po-
sitions. The Ònon-coreÓ workers are largely employed as part-time or subcon-
tracted for short-term stints. Understandably, the demand elasticity for Ònon-
coreÓ workers is high, their bargaining power is minimal, and their wages are
likely to be kept low. Owing to the temporary nature of their jobs, further-
more, unskilled workers subcontracted under the Housing Authority received
the lowest level of protection from the Labor Law and were exploited. They
suffered long working hours with neither medical care nor paid holidays.31 In
one extreme case, widely reported by local media, an elderly woman who
worked as a cleaner for 16 hours a day was paid only HK$ 6 [$0.80] per hour.
Low wages and lack of fringe beneÞts exacerbated the harshness of life for the
mass of low-skilled service workers.
31. Wong, ÒXianggang Jiushi Niandai Pinqiong de Yuanyin.Ó
table 11 Comparison of the Level of Social Security Allowance among 
Some Chinese Cities
Year City
Amount of 
Social Security Allowance
Amount of Social 
Security Allowance
as Percentage of 
Average Income
(%)
1992 Taipei, Taiwan NT$ 4,920 (US$600) 34
1993 Guangzhou, China RMB 200 (US$24) 59.6
1993 Shanghai, China RMB 120 (US$15) 33.7
1993 Beijing, China RMB 125 (US$1,025) 44.1
1995 Hong Kong HK$ 1,490 (US$182) (adult) 15.9
HK$ 1,810 (US$221) (elderly) 19.4
SOURCE: United Daily News (Hong Kong), October 16, 1995.
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New Immigrants from the Mainland
In relation to the phenomenon of income inequality in Hong Kong, there is a
recent claim, from both society at large and the public media, that new immi-
grants from Mainland China account for a large portion of the increases in the
work force and the population of the poor, and hence, the increase in income
inequality. In view of this, we would like to analyze the contribution and sig-
niÞcance of new immigrants to the increase in overall income inequality.
However, because of problems with data availability and integrity, we are not
able to separate out data on new immigrantsÕ income and recalculate the Gini
coefÞcient. Nevertheless, we can assess this contribution by utilizing the new
arrival/immigrants survey data done by the governmentÕs Home Affairs De-
partment, comparing the demographic characteristics, labor force characteris-
tics, education attainment, and income distribution of the new arrivals with
those of the overall Hong Kong population.
Table 12 illustrates the distribution of the level of monthly income from
main employment of the new arrivals between 1998 and 2001. The percentage
of new arrivals (out of the total number of families of new arrivals) earning
table 12 Income Distribution of the New Arrivals from the Mainland
in Hong Kong between 1998 and 2001 (%)
Monthly Income from
Main Employment (HK$) 1998 1999 2000 2001
,3,000 (US$385) 13.1 15.0 18.4 28.7
3,000—4,999 (US$385—$641) 11.8 10.1 11.6 11.7
5,000—6,999 (US$641—$897) 20.3 19.2 19.4 17.8
7,000—8,999 (US$897—$1,154) 23.6 22.5 19.7 17.8
9,000—10,999 (US$1,154—$1,410) 17.1 16.6 14.5 12.2
11,000—12,999 (US$1,410—$1,666) 6.6 7.9 7.2 5.4
13,000—14,999 (US$1,667—$1,923) 3.3 3.7 3.5 2.8
15,000 (US$1,923) and over 3.4 4.8 5.7 5.2
Median monthly income of
new arrivals from main
employment (HK$) 7,400 7,500 7,100 6,100
(US$949) (US$962) (US$910) (US$782)
Median monthly income of 
Hong Kong population from 
main employment (HK$) 9,500 —— —— 10,000
(US$1,218)* (US$1,282)
SOURCE: Home Affairs Department, Survey on New Arrivals from the Mainland (Fourth Quarter
of 2002), ,http://www.info.gov.hk/had/images/pdf/report_2002q4.pdf., accessed June 14, 2003.
* This Þgure is based on the 1996 population census.
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less than HK$ 3,000 ($345) had recorded a twofold increase, from 13.1% to
28.7%, and the percentages in every income category (apart from the richest
category of those who earn HK$ 15,000 [$1,923] or more) had indicated a de-
crease. The median monthly income from main employment of the new arriv-
als dropped from HK$ 7,400 ($948) to HK$ 6,100 ($782), which was much
lower than the HK$ 10,000 ($1,282) median monthly income earned by Hong
Kong residents as a whole, as indicated in the 2001 population census.32 The
percentage of new arrivals earning less than HK$ 3,000 ($385) in monthly in-
come from main employment in 2001 increased by 119% as compared with
that in 1998. The new arrivals are a group of low-paid laborers and the associ-
ated poor population. Thus, their presence notably aggravates the level of
income inequality in Hong Kong.
Based on Table 13, the majority of the new immigrants, about 82.2% of
them in 2002, were earning household incomes between HK$ 2,000 ($256)
and HK$ 10,000 ($1,282). On the contrary, only 24.1% of Hong Kong house-
holds earned incomes within that low level. Even the high-income group
within the new immigrants was earning less than the median income of the
32. Census and Statistics Department, 2001 Population Census Summary Results.
table 13 Domestic Household Income Distribution of New Immigrants
and Hong Kong Population in 2001 (%)
Monthly Domestic
Household Income (HK$) Whole Territory
New
Immigrants
,2,000 (US$256) 3.2 14.4
2,000—3,999 (US$256—$513) 4.8 20.2
4,000—5,999 (US$513—$769) 4.5 14.8
6,000—7,999 (US$769—$1,026) 5.7 17.8
8,000—9,999 (US$1,026—$1,282) 5.9 15.0
10,000—14,999 (US$1,282—$1,923) 15.5 8.8
15,000—19,999 (US$1,923—$2,564) 12.8 4.0
20,000—24,999 (US$2,564—$3,205) 10.9 4.0
25,000—29,999 (US$3,205—$3,846) 7.8 1.0
30,000—39,999 (US$3,846—$5,128) 10.7 0
40,000—59,999 (US$5,128—$7,692) 9.6 0
60,000 (US$7,692) and over 8.6 0
Median Household Income (HK$) 18,704 (US$2,398) 7,000 (US$897)
SOURCE: Census and Statistics Department, 2001 Population Census Summary Results, ,http://
www.info.gov.hk/censtatd/eng/hkstat/fas/01c/01c_index.html., accessed June 13, 2003; Home
Affairs Department, Survey on New Arrivals from the Mainland (Fourth Quarter of 2002), ,http://
www.info.gov.hk/had/images/pdf/report_2002q4.pdf., accessed June 14, 2003.
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Hong Kong population. The majority of Hong Kong households were earning
more than HK$ 10,000 ($1,282). The median household income of Hong Kong
population was HK$ 18,704 ($2,398), while the median household income of
new immigrants was only HK$ 7,000 ($897).
Every year there are around 50,000 new immigrants arriving in Hong Kong.
Referring to Table 14, in 2002, there were 45,234 new immigrants; this consti-
tuted 0.67% of the total Hong Kong population. The cumulative sum of new
immigrants in the past Þve years was 267,083, but their proportion of the total
population was only 3.94%. For the labor force, 9,602 new immigrants partic-
ipated in Hong Kong labor markets, a proportion of 0.28%. The proportion of
the cumulative sum of new immigrants in the past Þve years constituted just
1.29% of the total labor force. The proportion of new immigrants to total pop-
ulation and labor force is not as signiÞcant as widely thought. Though the
proportion of new immigrants attaining tertiary education is lower than that of
Hong Kong people, the ratio for secondary education was even slightly higher
than that of residents. As the education level of new immigrants is not signiÞ-
cantly lower than that of Hong Kong people, the unemployment rate of new
table 14 Comparison between New Immigrants and Total Hong Kong 
Population in 2002
New Immigrants
from Mainland
China
 Hong Kong 
Population
Proportion to
Total Hong Kong 
Population (%)
Demographic characteristics
Population 45,234 6,787,000 0.67
Cumulative sum of
population in past 5 years 267,083 6,787,000 3.94
Labor force characteristics
Labor force 9,604 3,487,900 0.28
Cumulative sum of labor
force in the past 5 years 44,946 3,487,900 1.29
Unemployment rate 3.5% 7.3%
Education
Proportion of non-student
population having attained
secondary education 57.4% 54.6%*
Proportion of non-student
population having attained
tertiary education 8.9% 16.4%*
SOURCE: Same as Table 13.
* These Þgures are based on 2001 census due to data availability.
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immigrants in 2001 was understandably lower than Hong KongÕs overall un-
employment rate, i.e., 3.5% and 7.3%, respectively. The new immigrants are
quite economically active. Therefore, it is demonstrable that these arrivals from
Mainland China have boosted the populations of low-paid laborers and poor.
However, owing to their relatively small numbers within the broad popula-
tion, the education system, and the labor market, we conclude that they are a
factor in exacerbating overall income inequality in Hong Kong, but an insig-
niÞcant one.
Concluding Remarks
This article has tried to assess the changing trends and magnitudes of income
disparity among Hong KongÕs different income groups by an examination of
household income data. It also sets out to examine the factors responsible for
the worsening of inequality in recent decades, particularly in the period of
economic restructuring of the 1990s. The Þndings do not deny that Hong Kong
has been a successful example of laissez-faire capitalism along the lines pro-
posed by neoclassical economic theory and has achieved a remarkable degree
of economic prosperity. However, this study reveals that a truly equitable in-
come distribution is still out of reach for Hong Kong society despite sustained
economic growth since the late 1960s. After observing the rising trend of the
Gini coefÞcient, we note that the process of economic restructuring, involving
phasing out manufacturing industries and upgrading to a service economy, has
not reduced the problem of income disparities but may even have made it
worse. Furthermore, this state of affairs seems likely to continue, given the
current Hong Kong governmentÕs thinking in the era of post-industrial restruc-
turing. It can be concluded that economic growth and structural change in a
laissez-faire capitalist economy do not necessarily lead to a more equitable so-
ciety, if the government holds back from a distributive socioeconomic devel-
opment policy.
This study also reveals as unsubstantiated the broadly held public belief that
new immigrants from Mainland China, who mainly engage in low-paid jobs
and live on subsistence-level social security, are one of the major factors exac-
erbating income inequality in Hong Kong. Generally speaking, the new arriv-
als are groups of poor and low-paid workers, but they are very economically
active, acquiring reasonable educations and achieving much lower unemploy-
ment rates than the blue-collar labor sector in Hong Kong. Furthermore, given
that they are relatively few, in proportion to the total population and labor
force, the new immigrants are not a major factor exacerbating income inequal-
ity in Hong Kong. The fundamental cause of the increase in income inequality
is the focus of our analysis: overall economic restructuring without the neces-
sary backup of government-led economic and social policies.
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The validity of KuznetsÕs belief has been undermined by the case of Hong
Kong, which, following a typical laissez-faire model, has successfully devel-
oped its economy to a high degree of prosperity.33 However, the convergence
toward equality has not taken place with the achievement of fully developed
status. From the experience of Hong Kong, it is not clear at what point the ex-
tent of income inequality will begin to narrow, as predicted by KuznetsÕs the-
sis. It seems that the most effective ways of eliminating income inequality are
not only the concomitants of rapid economic growth but also depend heavily
on Ògovernment attitudes to inequality and the will to prosecute equalization
policies vigorously.Ó34
It has been clariÞed in many studies that rapid economic growth and a more
equitable distribution of income are not necessarily incompatible as develop-
ment objectives.35 The choice is not between more growth and more equality,
but about whether a given type of economic growth principally helps the very
rich or leads instead to a wider distribution of economic beneÞts. At the very
least, as suggested by Todaro, the Òreduction of mass poverty can stimulate a
healthy economic expansion by acting as a powerful material and psychologi-
cal incentive to widespread public participation in the development process.Ó36
By contrast, wide income disparities and substantial absolute poverty could
negatively affect economic progress and social development.
In our opinion, the government policy of minimum intervention in the
economy is a key factor in the pattern of increasing inequality in Hong Kong.
The government should not only concern itself with economic growth, but
should also play an active role in promoting necessary redistributive justice
and a reduction in inequalities. It should redeÞne its development goal as
growth with improved income distribution. Therefore, funneling resources into
a redistributive network is necessary. It is also imperative for the Hong Kong
government to intervene in the labor market to improve income distribution
and eliminate factors that make for a Òpoverty trap.Ó
Looking ahead, we are pessimistic, assessing that the widening income gap
will continue. For one thing, we believe that economic restructuring will gen-
erate a small, extremely wealthy class of Ònew richÓ and simultaneously, under
inadequate social policies, a large population of Ònew poor.Ó Although struc-
tural changes in the economy is a mainstay for achieving sustained development,
such changes, as we have concluded, will not necessarily lead to prosperity
for all.
33. Michael Enright, Edith Scott, and David Dodwell, The Hong Kong Advantage (Hong
Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997).
34. Gilbert and Goodman, ÒRegional Income Disparities.Ó
35. Michael Todaro, Economic Development, seventh edition (Harlow, U.K.: Addison Wesley
Longman, 2000).
36. Ibid.
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We frequently feel the need to argue for a more equitable society, since we
believe that in order to sustain Hong KongÕs prosperity, a higher value should
be placed on the population as a whole and on social stability. The latter is a
necessary condition for economic development and continuous prosperity.37
In the view of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore, globalization has
brought his country opportunities for skilled workers and professionals, but at
the same time has widened the gap between rich and poor. He proclaimed that
the government should focus on making peopleÕs lives better, rather than en-
larging the income gap.38 If the ultimate goal of economic development is the
improvement of the well-being of all people, the Hong Kong government
should pursue a more equitable socioeconomic development policy, rather
than a solely growth-driven one. Of course, the promotion of income equality
represents a long road, and would constitute a great challenge for the govern-
ment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Appendix: A Brief Note on Methodology
To analyze the income distribution pattern, the aggregate distribution of in-
come has been adopted as a principal measure.39 It simply deals with individu-
als or households and the total incomes received. All data of income is in real
term, i.e., deßated by the inßation or consumer price index. The income for
households has been divided into successive groups from lowest to highest
and then the proportion of the total national income received by each income
group is determined. The measure of aggregate income distribution not only
displays the pattern of income distribution from poor to rich directly but also
reßects the extent of income inequality. If the top 20% of households by in-
come has a disproportionate share of more than 50% of the national total,
while the bottom 20% has only a small percentage, the degree of income in-
equality is obviously very high.
In this study, two popular measures of income inequality that often appear
in the literature, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefÞcients, have been used.
The Lorenz curve is probably the most widely used graphical display of in-
come distribution. The horizontal axis plots the number of income recipients
at 10 points for the 10 decile groups, from the lowest to the highest earners, in
cumulative percentage terms. The vertical axis plots the cumulative percent-
age share of income going to the successively accumulated deciles of income
earning units, adding up to 100%. If each percentage group of income recipients
37. ING Barings, ÒIncreasing Income Inequality Could Threaten Hong KongÕs Prosperity,Ó
,http://www.ingbarings.com/pweb-modules/press/press/24aug00.htm., accessed June 10, 2003.
38. Agence France-Presse, ÒSingapore Facing Growing Income Gap, Says PM Goh,Ó ,http://
www.singapore-window.org/sw01/010304a1.htm., accessed June 10, 2003.
39. Chow, Economic Growth and Income DistributionÓ; Todaro, Economic Development.
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were to receive its respective percentage of the national total, the Lorenz curve
would be a 458 diagonal and, as such, would be representative of Òperfect
equalityÓ in the aggregate distribution of income. This means, for example,
that the bottom 40% would receive 40% of the total income, while the upper
5% would receive only 5%. At every point on that diagonal, the percentage of in-
come received would be equal to the cumulative percentage of income recipients.
However, the curve traced by a given empirical income distribution will
usually lag beneath the diagonal, because no country exhibits perfect equality
in its distribution of income.40 For example, the poorest 20% of households
may earn only 5% of the total national income, while the richest 20% receives
over 50%. The more the Lorenz curves away from the diagonalÑthe greater
the bend or the nearness to the bottom axisÑthe greater the degree of inequality
represented.
Closely related to the Lorenz curve diagrammatic display of income distribu-
tion, the Gini coefÞcient is another effective way of representing the relative
degree of income inequality.41 The Gini coefÞcient is deÞned as formula (1)
where P1i is income distribution for a particular income category, the ratio of
Y1 (average income) to the total income; P2i is the income distribution for an-
other income category, the ratio of Y2 (the population) to the total population.
It is a value ranging between 0 and 1.
A Gini coefÞcient of 0 would represent perfect equality, and 1 would repre-
sent extreme inequality. The Gini coefÞcient for most developing countries
with highly unequal income distributions typically lies between 0.50 and 0.70.
For developed countries with relatively equitable income distributions, it is
likely to range from 0.20 to 0.35.42
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40. Ibid.
41. P. Coulter, Measuring Inequality: A Methodological Handbook (Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press, 1989); Todaro, Economic Development; Zhao Xiaobin, ÒSpatial Disparities and Economic
Development in China, 1953—92: A Comparative Study,Ó Development and Change 27:1 (1996),
pp. 131—60.
42. Todaro, Economic Development.
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